This would be wrong. The development that could have a far greater impact on far more people for far longer took place on Monday around a conference table in Geneva.

But before coming to the goings-on in Switzerland, a brief detour to the Middle East is necessary.

History is littered with wars. Most of these have had little consequence for anyone other than those unfortunate enough to be directly involved. The most recent flare-up in the Middle East is one such conflict.

From a humanitarian perspective the crisis has, of course, been appalling, as all wars are. But for those not suffering its direct effects, the conflagration in Lebanon and northern Israel is of real significance only if it spills over into a wider regional conflict.

Despite much excited talk, this is very unlikely because, quite simply, no country believes it has anything to gain from allout war.

Israel's Arab neighbours have neither an interest in starting a war nor the capacity to wage one. Much as they resent what they see as an alien presence in their midst and feel humiliated every time the Jewish state throws its weight around in the region, they are (however grudgingly) reconciled to its existence. Syria may be an exception, but even the Ba'athists in Damascus do not wish to escalate the conflict. They have too much to lose.

Only Iran has a real interest in stirring things up, mainly to deflect attention from its nuclear programme. But the (nonArab Shia) regime in Tehran will tread carefully for fear of provoking Israel's ally, the US, which has it boxed in on all sides: to its west in Iraq; to its east in Afghanistan; to its north in the Caucasus; and to its south in the Persian Gulf.

So back to the shores of Lake Geneva, where the development that may turn out to be of real long-term significance took place.

Though the hideous complexity of trade diplomacy makes it unfriendly to media coverage, this should not mask the fact that the collapse of world trade talks on Monday, after five years of negotiations, is profoundly bad news for the world and for Ireland.

Why did the talks collapse and what are the consequences?

Although one of the reasons for the failure was a developing world more assertively pursuing its interests (no bad thing), most blame lies squarely at the door of the rich world.

In essence, Europe and the US have preferred to placate a small but powerful domestic interest group (farmers) rather than agreeing a deal that would be better for the vast majority of their own people, and for the rest of the world.

The myopia of protecting farmers at all costs has long afflicted Europe. What marked the current round of talks out from all others since the multilateral trading system was established after World War II was the stance of the US.

American leadership led to the establishment of the post-war liberal order and sustained it for more than half a century. To avoid the mistakes of the 1930s, when protectionism contributed to that decade's economic collapse and subsequent descent into world war, the US drove successive trade rounds and eschewed the temptation to develop bilateral trade deals in the interest of maintaining the multilateral system.

But for more than a decade, the US has started acting more like other countries. It may be unfair to fault Americans for not being uniquely virtuous, but without their leadership, and with no sign of the Europeans stepping up to the plate, it is hard to see how the multilateral system will not be subject to gradual erosion.

So what, some might say.

How can an obscure set of rules that very few people understand have much effect on anyone? It is very easy to see why the significance of Monday's failure in Geneva could be shrugged off in this way.

But this would be very wrong.

The multilateral trading system has provided the basic ground rules for the current wave of globalisation that has spurred world prosperity.

Without these rules, trading and investment becomes much riskier.

Companies rein in their ambitions and stick closer to home. Governments reinforce this trend by focusing their trade diplomacy on bilateral and regional deals, diverting economic activity from more distant regions. At a time of strong protectionist impulses in the developed world, the temptation to haul up the drawbridge and seek refuge in regional blocs is all the greater.

This is particularly worrying for Ireland. If Monday's collapse presages a period of 'deglobalisation', Ireland will suffer disproportionately, just as it benefited disproportionately by exploiting the opportunities generated by globalisation.

The country's tigerish success has flowed from making itself a hub in economic activity between two regions, Europe and the US. Though embedded in the European single market, Ireland's manufacturing base is, to all intents and purposes, US-owned, its export success US-driven and its rise up the value chain USfuelled.

If corporate America were compelled to disengage from Ireland, the economy would suffer a decline of a structural nature considerably more serious than the sort of slump that would take place if the property market were to pop.

Just in case anyone thinks such things don't happen, think of the 1930s when the world lost its collective reason and locked itself into a downward isolationist spiral. Beggarthy-neighbour trade barriers were imposed and international investments uprooted. Depression deepened. Extremists and demagogues filled the vacuum. By the end of the decade the world had gone over the edge and into the abyss.

We seem a very long way from anything like such a scenario at the beginning of the 21st century. But 100 years ago, during an earlier era of globalisation, the horrors of 1914-45 seemed unthinkable. That, surely, is reason enough not to take for granted the liberal economic order that emerged from the ashes of World War II and to make whatever concessions are necessary to preserve it.

Dan O'Brien is a senior editor at the Economist Intelligence Unit danobrien@economist. com