Being able to string a few words together and smile now and then, shake the odd hand and crack a few shaky oneliners has brought multitudes of mediocre men to dizzy heights in many a third-rate organisation in Ireland.

But nowadays, mostly, you need more than a bit of blarney to be taken seriously at work. Thank you God.

Yet we still love to perpetrate the myth that merely communicating is more important than the output of that communication and that any interaction is good interaction at work. We get people together as often as possible and instigate groups and teams and sections and factions like some corporate love island.

People embrace their groups, see it as a type of office family and settle in for the round robin of introductions with gusto. Group gusto, naturally.

A few days in, they're all saying 'we' and agreeing their group is the group to be in, that everybody is on the ball . . .

apart from the muttering odd ball in the corner . . . and great things are in the offing once the still ongoing round robins part III are done with.

Don't many hands make light work? Ehf no.

Information coming from social and psychological sciences tells us that the quality of interaction and the way we approach people can make us easier to work with, but regardless of our personal charm, havoc can be wreaked on organisational outcomes when we get together in groups.

Sometimes it's not the other people, sometimes it's not us, it's the inter-effects; its how we synergise and fit that makes us dangerous to be around.

It turns on its head the notion that ten people will design a better bridge than one, or that eight different experts are set to develop a more efficient tram system than just two, or even that 15 top-ranking politicians will come up with a more robust strategy for tackling the road safety problems, for instance, than would one or two sharp experts.

Nothing to do with politicians, but think 'fools seldom differ' rather than that 'great minds alike' line.

Thinking alike is a big problem for people working in groups, and the solution is more likely to be provided by that ostracised, muttering maverick in the corner whom nobody takes to coffee than it is by the wise-cracking, hailfellow-well-met 'people person' at the helm.

The phenomenon known as groupthink is one of the most pervasive and sinister at work today because it pretends to be its opposite and so can fool even the most forensic sceptic.

Groupthink is evident in decision processes which are flawed due to the interaction of the people in the group; it's not just a case of people being followers, or agreeing for the sake of it, or giving in to majority rule. That can happen but there's awareness at conscious level when it's happening.

Groupthink is way more subtle.

Groupthink, coined by social psychologist Irving Janis (1972), is when members of the group suspend individual consciousness and volunteer up awareness, so that a perverse but seemingly reasonable view rises to the prime spot in any discussion/decision process.

As it rises in strength among those diminished 'group people', it acts as its own reinforcement and gradually becomes the absolute answer to the problem posed to the group.

At its worst, Groupthink means that eight people given the task of deciding the launch price of a share become totally committed to selling at 2.80, for instance. Afterwards, when the myopic vision caused by being together dissipates, each realises too late that he or she didn't really think that at all; it was just a communal urge which blinded each participant to the other more reasoned and workable options available. It's as if the availability of alternatives gets shrunk as the group gains cohesion and the deadline approaches.

It doesn't mean people together are always bad for decent decision-making, but groups are especially vulnerable to groupthink at times . . .

when its members are similar in background, when the group is insulated from outside opinions, and when there are no clear rules for decisionmaking.

Symptoms of groupthink Janis has documented eight symptoms of groupthink:

? Feeling invulnerable: this creates excessive optimism and encourages taking extreme risks.

? Collective rationalisation:

members discount warning signs.

? Belief in inherent morality:

each believes in the rightness of their cause over outcomes.

? Stereotyped views of outgroups: negative views of 'enemy' (other) dominate.

? Direct pressure on dissenters: members can't/don't express arguments against 'group' views.

? Self-censorship: doubts and deviations from the perceived group consensus are not expressed.

? Illusion of unanimity: majority view and judgments are assumed to be unanimous.

? Self-appointed 'mind guards': members protect the group and the leader from information that is problematic or contradictory to the group's cohesiveness, view, and/or decisions.

None of this might matter if groupthink led to good decisions, but it doesn't. Decisions shaped by groupthink have a low probability of achieving successful outcomes. Decisions made individually or in groups without groupthink may be unsuccessful too, but the vast majority of groupthink decisions are not just wrong, they're startlingly wrong, yet were startlingly passionately delivered.

The US failures to anticipate the attack on Pearl Harbour, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation of the Vietnam war, and the ill-fated hostage rescue in Iran are all examples of Janis's groupthink. The Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq based on a policy of "pre-emptive use of military force against terrorists and rogue nations" could also be cited. The decision to rush to war in Iraq before a broad-based coalition of allies could be built has placed the US in an unenviable military situation in Iraq that is costly in terms of military deaths and casualties, diplomatic standing in the world, and economically.

Some may say this is just bad decision-making by wasters, but people who make bad decisions in groups can make great decisions individually so it's not just that.

Signs of groupthink a) Incomplete survey of alternatives;

b) Incomplete survey of objectives;

c) Failure to examine risks of preferred choice;

d) Failure to reappraise initially rejected alternatives;

e) Poor information search;

f) Selective bias in processing information at hand;

g) Failure to work out contingency plans;

h) Low probability of successful outcome;

Avoiding groupthink Groupthink may be prevented by adopting some of the following measures:

a) The leader should assign the role of critical evaluator to each member.

b) The leader should avoid stating preferences and expectations at the outset . . .

try to avoid mid-term 'agreements'.

c) Each member of the group should routinely discuss the group's deliberations with a trusted associate and report back to the group on the associate's reactions . . . an outsider's view will stabilise internal bias.

d) Experts should be invited to meetings on a staggered basis.

The outside experts should be encouraged to challenge views of the members.

e) At least one knowledgeable, outspoken person is given the role of devil's advocate (to question assumptions and plans). That's presuming I am not in the group, as that's my seat.

f) The leader should make sure that enough time is given to survey warning signals from rivals; each should separately construct alternative scenarios of rivals' intentions.