WHAT most non-Russian pundits missed while dissecting Vladimir Putin's antiAmerican broadside in Munich earlier this month was that his real audience was back home. That was made clear enough by the phalanx of Russian media he had brought along to the West's most important annual security gathering.

If Putin abides by Russia's constitution, he will have to cede power after two terms following March 2008 elections. Yet he shows signs he is looking for a way to continue influencing and perhaps even running a resurgent Russia that he has built up as an increasingly authoritarian energy superpower, making the coming year a pivotal one in post-Soviet history.

So, to prepare the ground, even a man with Putin's current 70%-plus popularity in Russia must solidify his base.

And nothing does that better in Russia's newly confident mood than bashing Washington for perceived humiliations, chief among them Nato's advance to Russia's borders. Russians love him each time he further wipes away memories of predecessors they considered as too weak (Mikhail Gorbachev) or too drunk (Boris Yeltsin).

Now, as the end of his second term approaches, Putin must either manoeuver to stay in power or ensure a safe and comfortable retirement for himself, as Yeltsin did in appointing Putin. Putin either needs a Putin . . . or he must remain Putin.

It is in that context . . . and with the knowledge that Putin saw little cost to pay in relations with an embattled President Bush (whom he oddly complimented while attacking his policies) . . . that one should read his salvos at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy.

Domestic Content In a speech onto which he was scribbling until shortly before delivery, Putin said:
"Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyperuse of force . . . military force . . .in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. The United States has overstepped its national borders in every way.

Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?"

Still, don't expect any overt Russian attack on the West in coming weeks beyond the recently announced tightened visa and tax procedures on foreigners working in Russia. Instead, regard this verbal offensive as stage-setting for Putin's next domestic moves. It was followed by a cabinet reshuffle that elevated KGB veteran, and Putin's Munich traveling companion, Sergei Ivanov to first deputy prime minister. The most likely outcome is the March 2008 election would endorse a hand-picked successor while Putin repairs to a different power base, such as Gazprom's recently announced skyscraper headquarters, tellingly located in St. Petersburg, not Moscow.

Job Swap Yet there is speculation that Putin may also be considering how he could get around the constitutional term-limit restriction. In one scenario, Russia's pliant parliament, the Duma, would at the right moment introduce legislation to weaken presidential power and instead shift authority to the office of prime minister, now held by the almost invisible apparatchik, Mikhail Fradkov.

Putin would then shift job titles and thus keep power.

Western objections would have little sting as Putin would be acting legally and with overwhelming domestic support, driven by steady economic growth and an expanding middle class.

Western and Russian investors would shrug and continue celebrating the high returns and soaring stock market Putin has produced.

A less democratic Russia (and high oil prices) produced stock-market gains of 71% last year; Russian companies on foreign and domestic markets raised $17.5bn in initial public offerings in 2006, more than three times that of 2005.

No Price

If there's a price for Putin's authoritarian ways, he hasn't felt it, and that can only encourage a bold move to maintain power. Indeed, the lukewarm reception of the most recent Russian IPOs could indicate nervousness about the Putin succession.

Don't bet your last ruble on this president-prime minister switcheroo. It could be just so much smoke from former spy Putin, whose pattern is to make such important moves at the last moment without warning. Yet what the story suggests is important: Putin's next weeks are all about gaming how to keep power after 2008.

And for that he can count on a new nomenklatura that sees its own interests tied up in Putin's continued rule. The annual meeting of business leaders with Putin, which began shortly after he took power, with his promise that they could keep their spoils if they stayed out of politics, has become the hottest ticket for the corporate class. It is a public embarrassment to an oligarch not to be invited and a sign of commitment to Putin to attend.

Can't Retire

"Putin has built a structure that does not allow him to retire, " Anders Aslund wrote in last weeks Moscow Times.

"Yeltsin could do so because he had established a certain rule of law, which guaranteed the validity of the law on his immunity.

"Putin has undermined the rule of law to such an extent that he cannot repeat Yeltsin's elegant exit because no successor can guarantee that he will not be prosecuted."' Putin isn't ready to repair to his dacha to write his memoirs. He knows that in the Russia he has created you lose power when you leave power. The smart money is betting he doesn't plan to do either.