On this issue, in public at least, the Meath politician seems to move out of the minority camp. According to Mary Hanafin, the idea of a Fianna Fail/Sinn Fein coalition "would be unacceptable to the Irish people". In the words of Micheal Martin, Fianna Fail "won't be going into government with Sinn Fein or seeking their support" to prop up a minority Fianna Fail arrangement. Willie O'Dea pledged that there would be no formal or informal agreement with Sinn Fein. Brian Lenihan said such a move "would not be in the national interest".

So the message has been strongly delivered . . .

Fianna Fail will not do a deal with Sinn Fein after this week's general election. Before examining whether Fianna Fail might change its mind on the Sinn Fein issue, its rigid stance does, however, raise the question: why not?

Why not? The past It was only 15 years ago that respectable politicians in the Republic could not be seen to be talking to Gerry Adams or any of his colleagues in Sinn Fein, then very firmly the political wing of the IRA. In early 1992, when Albert Reynolds replaced Charlie Haughey as taoiseach, the official policy in relation to republicans was defined by marginalisation.

The nascent peace process involving background contacts with Adams was a clandestine operation.

The first sign of the changes to come emerged with the ending of the broadcasting ban in early 1994. Republicans had access to the airwaves and, in subsequent years, the public listened and watched as politics overcame conflict in Northern Ireland. The absence of violence combined with republican acceptance of police structures in the North earlier this month led Ian Paisley to cement a deal with Sinn Fein.

With the IRA now a Dad's Army . . . unarmed and inactive . . . there should be no reason why Fianna Fail would use the recent past, bloody as it was, as a justification for excluding Sinn Fein as a coalition partner. There is also little strength in the argument about the Northern executive being a devolved institution with limited power vis-a-vis the sovereign state powers of the Republic's government. If the conflict is over, and Sinn Fein is wedded to the democratic system, then the party should be part of the governmental mix. The past does not offer an adequate explanation for ruling out Fianna Fail/Sinn Fein.

Why not? The policies With peace in the North, Fianna Fail has moved its main objection to coalition involvement with Sinn Fein onto the incompatibility of their respective policies. "We don't see them as a likeminded party, " Brian Lenihan said last week.

There is some merit in this argument, although it is weakened by Fianna Fail's ease of movement between Labour and the Progressive Democrats as coalition partners.

Sinn Fein's election manifesto, published last week, reflects the party's anti-establishment positioning. The party favours big-budget public spending and strong state interventionism. There has, however, been a significant moderation in recent months in its attitude to private enterprise and taxation.

Sinn Fein has long been an opponent of privatesector involvement in areas such as transport and health. The party opposed the partial sell-off of Aer Lingus and now wants to examine the possibility of buying back shares in the national airline. In addition, the party is proposing Eircom's return to public ownership. If that is not possible it wants to establish a new telecom operator owned by the state. There is little in these proposals that would not find favour in sections of Fianna Fail.

Likewise Sinn Fein's insistence that taxpayers' money shou; ld solely benefit the public health system would not be far removed from some Fianna Fail thinking. The centrepiece of the Sinn Fein solution to the health service is the creation of a national health service similar to that in the United Kingdom. This Irish NHS would provide "free care and medication for all who need it". But in the meantime . . . and as a sign of new realism . . .

the party is proposing a transitional arrangement with free GP care for everyone under the age of 18.

Moderation is now the theme of Sinn Fein's policy prescription. For example, previously, the party wanted to bring the banking sector under state ownership. "Ultimately the banking sector should be nationalised so that the Irish people are the true beneficiaries of this vastly profitable business, " the party argued in a pre-budget submission in 1999. There is little or no talk of these proposals now.

In addition, the central plank of the party's income tax policy used to be the introduction of a 'super tax' which would be applied to annual salaries above 100,000 at 50%. This income tax plan was coupled with capital gains tax being increased to 40% and corporation tax raised to 16% with a special levy for the financial sector.

These plans have now been shelved, with Gerry Adams saying the tax take is sufficient and his party aim to keep "taxes as low as possible".

To some these policy moves are unprincipled uturns but to others they are pragmatic shifts to allow the party to participate in government in the Republic. In truth, Sinn Fein has changed tack as it has positioned itself as a possible coalition partner for Fianna Fail.

Why not? The election Sinn Fein has five Dail seats. The party is hoping to make decent gains this week. An examination of its main target seats clearly indicates just why Fianna Fail may want to approach the party with considerable caution.

In the capital Sinn Fein has real hopes in Dublin North East (Dessie Ellis), Dublin North West (Larry O'Toole) and Dublin Central (Mary Lou McDonald). In each of these constituencies a Sinn Fein gain would probably be at Fianna Fail's expense. In Donegal North East and Donegal South West Sinn Fein is also hoping to win, again at the expense of Fianna Fail in Donegal North East and either Fine Gael or Fianna Fail in Donegal South West. If Sean McManus wins in Sligo/South Leitrim his election will cost Fianna Fail a seat.

In other areas where Sinn Fein has ambitions which may not be realised in this particular election, Fianna Fail seats are vulnerable. Fianna Fail TDs will be watching anxiously for the firstpreference performance of David Cullinane in Waterford, John Dwyer in Wexford and Joe Reilly in Meath. Just as in 1987, when the PDs gobbled up a sizeable portion of the Fine Gael vote, this time Fianna Fail is under pressure, with Sinn Fein moving onto its patch.

Moreover, the arrival of Sinn Fein is different from the emergence of smaller parties such as the PDs and the Greens, as Adams' party has the capacity to grow significantly as a political organisation. The party is putting down roots in new constituencies with young, post-Provo candidates who in future elections will take votes from Labour and, particularly, Fianna Fail.

So to return to the central question . . . why not Sinn Fein? The answer for Fianna Fail may be less about Sinn Fein's past or Sinn Fein's policies and more about Fianna Fail's electoral future. "A deathbed conversion, " minister O'Dea proclaimed last night about the changes in Sinn Fein polices.

But in the recent past Fianna Fail has proved itself the master of last-minute conversions. Remember how quickly the anti-coalition 'core value' was dropped when Fianna Fail smelt power with the old enemy, Des O'Malley, in 1989?

Depending on the final parliamentary numbers later this week, and if Labour stands aside and Sinn Fein offers a route back to government, the sequel to that 'core values' Fianna Fail u-turn may not be too far away.