This is Southern Baghdad, a security belt that Saddam filled with loyal Sunni tribal leaders, Republican Guards and a munitions factory, to protect the city from Shia in the south. It's also known as the Triangle of Death and the place where three US soldiers were captured in May.

The 10th Mountain Division of the US army, who fought the Nazis on skis in the Alps during WWII, operate here.

Last October, they devised a counterinsurgency battle plan in the desert.

They call it Reconciliation . . . moving past previous clashes, living and working with Iraqis to provide security, political and economic support that then fosters cooperation and intelligence.

They made good progress, but the catalyst for change came with the capture of their soldiers in the al-Qaeda entrenched Qharghulli tribal area.

"When the bad guys took those soldiers of ours, " said Lieutenant Colonel Infanti, "it was the worst mistake they made."

They flooded the area with soldiers and detained over 1,000 males before releasing most of them with the warning: either harbour terrorists and we'll keep fighting or get rid of them.

"A hundred and fifty insurgent names were handed over in the first two weeks, " said Captain Shane Finn. "They probably saw what happened in Anbar and wanted the same."

He was referring to Anbar Province, where the tribal leaders took control of security and rid the area of al-Qaeda oppression.

Today in this part of Iraq, a woman ran through the field to catch her wayward donkey, humvees were not blown up, the market is open again, and many locals are working on American reconstruction contracts.

The captured soldiers are still missing.

Captain Finn lives and works in a makeshift room in an unfinished Russian power plant that his rough-living McGuyvers converted into a base for themselves and their mechanised fleet.

He's surrounded by maps and counterinsurgency books.

His family hails from Cork. His grandfather fought at Iwo Jima during World War II and instilled Finn with military mystique. He's calm and competent, quick to smile and quick to anger, a former altar boy who wears his grandfather's St Christopher medal and a scapular in combat.

He wants these Iraqis to have a skilled workforce and political system when the government of Iraq finally takes control, but his primary goal is closer to heart.

"Everything, every conversation with locals and Sheiks is about getting intel to get the missing soldiers home, " he said.

Still at large Tonight he meets with three Sunni Sheiks at the barracks to work out local problems like water filtration and medicine. They give Finn names of al-Qaeda insurgents still at large.

On the wall, a man carrying an AK-47 is silhouetted against the night sky. He is one of 100 security volunteers. They've taken over their own security because they don't trust the police who they believe are part of the Shia militia, Jaysh al-Madhi (JAM).

The next night Finn led an air assault west of the Euphrates to raid a suspected al-Qaeda leader's house. At 2am, the helicopters dropped them, weapons ready, in the muddy yard of the target's house. If the insurgents decide to fight they'll do it here before the US soldiers can engage them. But there was no gunfire so they scanned for IEDs and boobytrapped doorways before entering houses.

Only women and children were home.

The soldiers found documents they needed on the al-Qaeda leadership, questioned a boy who ratted out his relatives for 40 dollars, and offered to release a teenage woman's husband from prison if she told them where the missing soldiers were. Unfortunately she didn't seem too keen to get him back.

Before I came to Iraq, soldiers told me that Iraqi children befriended them and people thanked them for the work they were doing. As a liberal living in New York, I eschewed their stories in favour of the media diet of the ultimate failure of Bush's War. I nodded at the daily statistical round up of murder and mayhem and bought into the notion that the country was torn by civil war and widespread sectarian strife.

That scenario didn't allow for chai tea and waving children, but 100 cups of tea and five districts later, I've learned that nothing is simple here and politicians visiting the Green Zone . . . light years removed from reality . . . count for nothing.

In the streets, the story was unexpected. Iraqis tell me there was no sectarian conflict before the fall of Saddam.

The mayor said much of the conflict is conducted by a small number of extremists backed by other predatory countries.

I couldn't find the civil war, but the US is preventing one. All month, across the provinces, Sheiks, soldiers, farmers, and politicians said they don't want the US forces to leave, at least not until the Iraqi Army is ready and they have a competent, non-sectarian government.

It's easy to criticise the Iraqi government's lack of action because it's limited, inexperienced and has little presence outside Baghdad.

Many of Iraq's brightest have left the country. The Iraqi police are so infiltrated by insurgents that they aren't trusted. In some places the Iraqi Army is effective but overall needs a lot more time than the American public may give.

Many people were angry that Bush didn't deliver on his promises, but others started taking the reins themselves.

Sunnis have formed successful voluntary security forces to combat al-Qaeda and are setting up local governments.

The Shia may be taking their first step against rogue elements.

In this low intensity war, the US military have taken a "bottom up" approach, dealing with economics and getting people back to working for money instead of planting bombs for it. With the exception of more oversight on how contracts are handled there is probably little more they can do except wait for the Iraqis to mature politically, militarily and economically.

Ultimately my travels showed me that the future of Iraq lies in the hands of the Iraqis. If the country stabilises, it will be because they are in control. Having experienced their warmth and hospitality, I hope it is so.