The full extent of Anglo Irish Bank's folly in setting up a high-risk property fund just as the bubble was bursting was laid bare last week. So far, the bank's annual report says, it has cost us the best part of €300m. Losses of €247m have been recognised because of the decline in the "recoverable amounts of the assets in the period" – or price drops to you and me – from September 2008 to the end of last year. That's hard enough to stomach but it was compounded by interest rate hedges that cost us an additional €47m "due to the decline in long-term market interest rates over the financial period".
On page 98 of the report we learn even more about how badly the portfolio has done. The bank held investment properties worth €110m at the end of September 2008 and added €279m more during the period because of its failure to syndicate them to private clients following the collapse of the property market. Taking into account currency movements, the cost of the properties came to €376m. After impairments and other depreciation the portfolio's net book value is €267m but, far more importantly, the fair value of investment property held was just €173m at the end of last year. That's a €200m drop in just 15 months. Those valuations were based on third-party valuers which were reviewed and agreed by management.
"These values are based on a sale in current, highly illiquid markets and reflect a lack of recent transactional evidence. The fair values do not represent the expected longer-term recoverable value of the properties on which the carrying amount is based," the bank claims. Small wonder, then, that it is "exploring its strategic options regarding these assets".
One of those options is bringing in an outside asset manager, and it has held drawn-out talks with Green Property about this, to try and recover value. Given the bank's history, it seems clear that the taxpayer would be better off removing the bank from day-to-day involvement with the portfolio other than as lender.
"On realisation of the various investments, there is no guarantee that policy-holders will recover some or all of the value of the amount of their investment," the prospectus for the high-risk property fund warned when it was circulated to Anglo's private clients. "The value of the asset shown in period valuations will either be at cost or will be a matter of an independent expert's opinion and the asset may be difficult to sell even at that value." It put enough of the private clients off that now we're the ones left carrying the can for a disastrous decision by the private bankers to buy off-pitch investments and long-term development plays at record prices just as the whole sorry mess came crumbling down. Expect more write-downs next year.