Klaus Regling: eurozone fund

The risk of Ireland being forced to make a call to the Luxembourg offices of Klaus Regling's eurozone stability bailout remains high. The government paid almost 4.75% in annual interest rate for the half-a-billion euro it borrowed last week for repayment in four years. That suggests there's a big chance – just short of a 50% probability – that finance minister Brian Lenihan will be dealing with Regling in the near future. Why? Because the auction rate is just short of the 5% that Greece pays for the benefit of having the bailout cash available for the next few years.


An auction hailed as a huge success actually shows that the bets are piling up against Ireland avoiding the stigma of tapping the bailout. By the end of the week the 4.75% auction rate had skipped back above 5%.


Many experts across Europe are sceptical that the markets will believe the government's banking recapitalisation announcement. The government is prepared to pay the markets at least two percentage points over the 'Greek going rate' of 5% to avoid the stigma of it too having to take the bailout cash. But its fate is no longer in its own hands.


Here we set out the tell-tale signs that Ireland is heading into the bailout crowd and assess the alternative chances of the government getting away with it.


* Not a great sign at any time: Davy Stockbrokers was selling Irish four-year sovereign bonds bought at Tuesday's auction to some of its private clients last week in very small lots of several thousand euro. It's not a great sign when a market maker for the NTMA parcels up such small amounts to Irish citizens.


* It's in the numbers (part 1): A month before Greece accepted its bailout, it was paying around 6.5% for both its four- and 10-year money. At the end of last week, Ireland's four-year rate had risen back above 5% and the 10-year rate was trading at 6.4%. Now, analysts believe that it will only get worse for Athens. "There's a 75% chance of Greece going further and defaulting in some way on its debt repayments in the next three years," said Ben May, the Ireland expert at Capital Economics.


* It's in the numbers (part 2): Together, the big banking bill and fiscal hole is too great for any sane analyst to digest; Ireland will report an annual budget deficit of around 25% of GDP in 2010, the largest annual shortfall in the history of peacetime Europe. Some believe an announcement designed to clear the air could, ironically, push the state into Regling's path.


* Elephant in the room (another credit rating downgrade): Mexico was this weekend paying almost the same interest rate – 6.5% – that Ireland pays to borrow money for 10 years. Yet, its low credit rating at BAA1 compares with Ireland's much higher rating. The credit rating agencies look at the prospects for the economy and government revenues. Could another rating downgrade due to weak government finances spark downgrades, inevitably pushing Dublin into the bailout crowd?


* A blow out in Portugal or Greece: Ireland and Portugal have been joined at the hip for so long that their fates are interlinked. Frankly, last week's market rates suggested it will be Ireland that tips Portugal into the bailout fund, not the other way around.


And signs the government will get away with it:


* There's too much at stake: The European Central Bank has bought €16bn, or about 20% of all Irish sovereign debt, on the secondary markets since the summer to keep Ireland away from the Luxembourg fund. Having also bought €31bn of Greek bonds and about €14bn of Portuguese debt, it will do a lot, lot more to stop Ireland and Portugal from following Greece.


* Don't panic (part 1): As Ciarán O'Hagan at Société Generale points out, Ireland remains one of the richest states in Europe. As long as it "radically" cuts the budget deficit, things will work out.


* Don't panic (part 2): The government has oodles of money – including the €14bn unencumbered investments in the National Pension Reserve Fund – to sell to avoid more big borrowings.


* The markets get it wrong all the time: Just because they are sovereign debt markets, not stockmarkets, does not make their bets any wiser.